This research and development was sponsored by t h e Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC-6). I t is part of a continuing project to evaluate t h e effects of programs in the Navy's Human Resource Management (HRM) Support System and to provide managers with t h e information required to monitor their programs. The objective of this effort was to determine the effect of HRM Cycle activities on reenlistment rates. This is t h e fifth in a series of reports concerning HRM. Previous reports addressed t h e relationship of HKM to nonjudicial punishment r a t e s (TR 76-5), operational readiness of Navy ships (TR 76-32), organizational climate perceptions of enlisted women and men , and disciplinary problems (TR 77-38).
SUMMARY

Problem and Background
The retention of qualified personnel has been a long-term concern of Navy managers. Since previous research has shown t h a t organizational development (OD) is related to reenlistment r a t e s in t h e military, it was hypothesized t h a t a t t e m p t s to improve organizational conditions would improve retention. One such a t t e m p t was t h e implementation of t h e Navy's Human Resource Management (HRM) Cycle, a command-specific, fleet-wide program for OD. During t h e Cycle, individual f l e e t units participate in a multiphased HRM program, which is aimed at improving command leadership and personnel management.
The Cycle typically includes a 5-day Human Resource Availability (HRAV), which is dedicated to t h e development of a Command Action Plan.
Purpose
The purpose of this e f f o r t was to determine whether participation in HRM Cycle activities, particularly t h e HRAV, would have a positive effect on a unit's first-term reenlistment rates.
Approach
An experimental sample of Pacific Fleet ships and air squadrons t h a t had participated in an HRAV was compared on two different measures of reenlistment with a matched (comparison) sample of commands t h a t had not participated. The measures compared were those f o r four reporting periods: (1) t h e 6-month period preceding t h e HRAV, (2) t h e 6-month period including t h e HRAV, (3) t h e 6-month period following t h e HRAV, and (4) a period from 12 to 18 months a f t e r t h e HRAV. Also, to allow for a more complete perspective on longitudinal changes, reenlistment measures f o r t h e experimental group were compared with those for all air and surface units in t h e Pacific Fleet.
Results
During t h e HRAV period, t h e experimental sample showed a significant increase in reenlistment r a t e s when compared to t h e control sample. Also, during t h e two post-HRAV comparison periods, reenlistment r a t e s for t h e experimental sample remained higher than those for t h e control group. These differences were not large enough t o obtain statistical significance, however. The experimental sample also surpassed t h e Pacific Fleet average during t h e last three reporting periods, despite being lower during t h e pre-HRAV period.
Conclusion and Recommendation
Participation in HRM activities by operational Navy units results in small, but significant, initial improvements in first-term reenlistment rates.
There are many factors, however, t h a t may influence t h e degree of effectiveness of HRM Cycle activities. Future research should a t t e m p t to identify specific elements t h a t a r e critical to HRM Cycle success rather than focus on overall effects. 
INTRODUCTION
Problem
The retention of qualified personnel has long been a concern of Navy managers and t h e target of considerable research. High attrition r a t e s among first-term enlistees have further emphasized the need to develop effective retention strategies.
Moreover, increasing levels of equipment technology and sophistication require considerable investments in training t h a t a r e lost when individuals leave t h e Navy at or before t h e end of a single enlistment.
Background
Previous research has shown t h a t t h e work environment is related to turnover in t h e civilian sector (Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1977; Porter & Steers, 1973; Price, 1977) , and to reenlistment r a t e s in t h e military LaRocco, Gunderson, & Pugh, 1975) . Likewise, studies by Bowers (1973) , Drexler and Bowers (1973) , and Franklin and Drexler (1976) suggest t h a t retention is a predictable outcome of t h e type of human resource management practiced within a unit. Thus, it appears t h a t efforts directed toward improving organizational conditions within Navy commands could improve retention rates.
In 1973, t h e Navy implemented t h e Human Resource Management Support System (HRMSS), a broadly-based program focused on leadership as a means of enhancing naval readiness. A key element of t h e HRMSS is t h e HRM Cycle, a command specific, fleetwide program for organizational development (OD). The HRM Cycle provides consultative assistance for improving command leadership and personnel management. I t focuses on issues identified by t h e commanding officer and senior personnel as hindering full utilization of t h e command's human resources. This approach is largely an outgrowth of O D efforts employing survey-guided development procedures (CNO, 1975; Forbes, 1976) .
The HRM Cycle generally requires 6 to 8 weeks' involvement with an individual command, and includes several distinct activities, such as t h e following:
1. Preparatory activities and initial visit.
2.
Data gathering, using t h e HRM Survey or other diagnostic techniques to identify areas needing improvement.
3.
Analysis of data.
4.
Feedback and diagnosis, including identification of a r e a s where improvement is needed.
5.
Setting command HRM Cycle objectives and planning for their implementation.
6. A dedicated period, t h e Human Resource Availability (HRAV) week, to address identified issues. The HRAV typically includes members from throughout t h e chain of command who participate in workshops and discussions focused on developing an overall Command Action Plan (CAP) for dealing with perceived critical issues and command objectives.
7. Unit actions to improve command conditions. 8. Continuing assistance as requested by the command.
9. Follow-up.
As with most OD efforts (e+, see Friedlander & Brown, 1974; Huse, 1975; Margulies ti Raia, 1978) , HRM activities do not address outcome variables such as retention per se. Rather, they concentrate on the intervening organizational processes hypothesized to be causally related to such outcomes. Nonetheless, if OD activities do improve human resources management within a unit, they may also result in positive changes in reenlistment rates.
Purpose
The purpose of the present study was to investigate t h e effect of HRM Cycle activities on units' first-term enlisted reenlistment rates. Based on previous research and t h e assumption t h a t OD efforts improve organizational conditions, it was hypothesized t h a t such activities would increase retention; t h a t is, t h a t t h e reenlistment r a t e s of units t h a t had participated in an HRAV would show more positive changes than those of a matched control group t h a t had not participated.
APPROACH
Criterion Measures
Since the HRM Cycle focuses on individual units, it was both desirable and necessary to use unit-level reenlistment rates as t h e criterion measure. Commands submit quarterly reports to CIN CPACFLT or CINCLANTFLT, as appropriate, providing their reenlistment statistics--both first-term and career. In t h e Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) only, these data have been compiled since July 1974; thus, sufficient first-term d a t a on PACFLT units were available for use in this study.
Two separate criterion measures were developed as indicators of first-term retention:
1. Actual Reenlistment Rate-The percentage of first-term personnel t h a t reenlisted among t h e pool of personnel who were eligible -and recommended for reenlistment. This statistic corresponds to t h e "official" reenlistment r a t e for t h e command.
2.
Gross Reenlistment Rate--It is possible for commands to increase their reenlistment r a t e by arbitrarily shifting personnel who have completed their enlistment but a r e not planning to reenlist into the ineligible category. Although there is no empirical evidence to indicate t h a t this practice is followed, t h e gross reenlistment r a t e was used to control for this possibility. This r a t e was computed using all personnel who were completing their enlistment, whether or not they had been recommended for reenlistment.
For both of these measures, individuals who were automatically extended in exchange f o r receiving advanced training were excluded. R a t e s were computed by quarters, beginning with July 1974 and ending in December 1975.
Criterion Stability Drexler and Franklin (1977) have discussed the importance of criterion stability over time. If commands show excessive variability on outcome measures across several reporting periods, it makes little sense to a t t e m p t to relate these outcomes systematically to a n activity such as t h e HRM Cycle. Because t h e number of individuals eligible for reenlistment (as well as t h e number who reenlist) on a given unit varies from one quarter to another and is often quite small on many ships, t h e stability of reenlistment r a t e s across periods can vary for artifactual reasons. For example, if a ship has one person eligible to reenlist in a quarter and he reenlists, t h e obtained r a t e is 100 percent. If t h a t s a m e ship has one person eligible during t h e following quarter and he fails to reenlist, t h e obtained r a t e is zero. Thus, over t h e two-quarter period, t h e ship has gone from a perfect reenlistment r a t e to t h e worst possible rate.
An a t t e m p t was made to reduce this type of error in t h e present study by excluding those units t h a t reported fewer than three reenlistment-eligible individuals for any quarter. As a result, many smaller units (e.g., submarines and fleet tugs) with relatively unstable reenlistment r a t e s were not included. Thus, if t h e effects of t h e HRM Cycle a r e related to t h e size of t h e unit, with smaller units showing more improvements than larger ones, t h e detectable effect would b e reduced.
To explore t h e stability of t h e data, correlations were computed between unit-level reenlistment rates for about 240 PACFLT units for each quarterly reporting period. In addition, since longer reporting periods tend to result in greater criterion stability (Drexler & Franklin, 1977) , correlations were computed between unit-level reenlistment r a t e s based on combined d a t a for two sequential quarters. The results of correlational analyses showed t h a t t h e r e was little stability across unit-level rates, regardless of whether 3-or 6-month periods were used. The correlation coefficients between r a t e s f o r 6-month periods were approximately .20. Those for t h e 3-month periods, while having a median value of .16, showed more variability, ranging from .03 to .20. Accordingly, d a t a f o r 6-month periods were used in t h e present comparisons.'
SaniDle
The experimental sample was chosen from Pacific Fleet commands participating in HRAVs between January and June 1975. For these units, actual and gross reenlistment r a t e s for three six-month periods were obtained: (1) Pre-HRAV (July-December 1974), (2) HRAV (January-June 1975), and (3) Post-HRAV (July-December 1975) . Units t h a t had missing information as well as those reporting fewer than three reenlistment-eligible personnel during any of these time periods were excluded from t h e experimental group.
Similar units t h a t had not participated in t h e HRM Cycle were selected as controls. These units were matched as closely as possible with t h e experimental units based on type (e&, escort, destroyer, tactical air squadron) of unit. The composition of t h e final sample, comprising 60 units (30 experimentals and 30 controls), is shown in Table 1 .
'A note seems in order concerning acceptable levels of stability in criterion data. Very low correlations between reporting periods (e.g., r = .OO to .lo) would suggest t h a t either t h e measurement process is unreliable or t h a t tke criterion measure is inherently unstable; t h a t is, units may not consistently rank either high o r low on t h e measure. On t h e other hand, very high correlations (e+, over .90) would suggest t h a t t h e particular measure is not sensitive t o situational factors, including OD efforts, and is a relatively permanent characteristic of t h e organization. Hence, either extremely high or extremely low correlations can be problematic in terms of focusing on longitudinal organizational change and OD e f f e c t s within Navy units. Comparisons were made between changes in first-term reenlistment r a t e s of t h e experimental and control units for t h e pre-HRAV, HRAV, and post-HRAV periods. Also, to explore t h e long-term effects of participation in t h e HRM Cycle, reenlistment r a t e s for t h e period approximately 12 to 18 months following t h e HRAV for 21 experimental units and 21 control units were compared. This sample was smaller than t h e original because nine of t h e control units participated in t h e HRM Cycle during t h e final t i m e period and had to be excluded, together with their corresponding matched experimental units. The result was a reconfigured sample of 11 ships and 10 air squadrons in both t h e experimental and control groups.
Statistical analyses performed included correlated t-tests, which a r e appropriate when experimental and control groups a r e formed using matched unit pairs (see McNemar, 1969, p. 116) . This t-test represents a comparison of change scores for experimental and control units.
A one-tailed test was used to determine significance, since i t was hypothesized t h a t t h e HRM Cycle would have a positive impact on both reenlistment rates.
Finally, to allow for a more complete perspective on longitudinal changes, reenlistment r a t e s of experimental and control units were compared with those of unit totals from all air and surface Pacific Fleet commands for t h e four reporting periods. No significance tests were computed since t h e d a t a were used f o r descriptive purposes only. Table 2 provides first-term actual and gross reenlistment rates for t h e experimental and control groups for t h e four reporting periods. As shown, experimental units showed increases in reenlistment r a t e s between t h e pre-and HRAV periods, while t h e r a t e s decreased for t h e control units.
RESULTS
The actual and gross reenlistment rates of the experimental units improved approximately 9 and 7 percent relative to those of t h e control units. Both differences a r e statistically significant. Fifty-seven percent of t h e experimental units improved, compared to 37 percent of t h e control units; nine percent of t h e experimental units experienced a decline in actual reenlistment rates, compared to 63 percent of t h e control units. (Thirty-four percent of t h e experimental units stayed t h e same.) No significant differences were found between changes in r a t e s between pre-and post-HRAV periods for t h e two groups. Although t h e actual and gross reenlistment r a t e s for both groups declined, t h e decline was much less for t h e experimental units than f o r t h e control units (4.6 and 3.4% vs. 7.1 and 6.9%).
Analyses undertaken to compare changes on actual and gross reenlistment r a t e s between t h e pre-HRAV period and t h e reporting period approximately 12 months l a t e r showed no significant differences between t h e experimental and control groups. The results, however, were in t h e predicted direction, since t h e experimental units showed more positive change.
Comparisons were also made between experimental units and Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) units at large. As shown, between t h e pre-and HRAV periods, experimental units showed increases of 5.8 and 3.9 percent in actual and gross reenlistment rates, respectively, as compared to 0.6 and -0.1 percent for t h e PACFLT units. Decreases between t h e pre-and post-HRAV periods were 4.6 and 3.4 percent for experimental units, compared to 7.7 and 6.1 percent for PACFLT units. Using PACFLT units as a baseline, HRAV units showed a relative gain of 7.7 and 5.3 percent in actual and gross reenlistment rates, respectively, between pre-HRAV and t h e final reporting period. Overall, these findings were consistent with those presented above. Figure I graphically illustrates t h e actual reenlistment r a t e s for all three groups. (The gross reenlistment rates a r e not graphically presented since they were similar t o t h e actual rates.) I t can be seen t h a t t h e experimental units, although slightly lower in reenlistment rates when compared t o t h e control units and Pacific Fleet before t h e HRAV, reached a higher r a t e in t h e HRAV period and maintained relative superiority during t h e post-periods. The dramatic decline in t h e Pacific Fleet r a t e for t h e reporting period covering t h e post-HRAV t i m e f r a m e (second half of 1975) undoubtedly accounts f o r t h e unexpected decline suffered by t h e experimental units. Figure 2 is an alternative graphic presentation t h a t uses t h e PACFLT reenlistment average as a baseline. That is, t h e graph represents t h e difference between t h e actual reenlistment r a t e s for PACFLT and t h e other groups during all four t i m e periods. As shown, t h e experimental units reached and maintained a higher average reenlistment r a t e compared to PACFLT and control units. Means for the pre-HRAV to post-HRAV periods for experimental and control units a r e based on 30 units for each group; whereas t h e mean for the fourth period is based on 21 units. Experimental and control rates represent t h e means of the individual unit data for each group. PACFLT rates are based on input from air and surface commands only and represent the mean of t h e aggregated totals across all units of these types. Figure 2 . Difference between t h e reenlistment r a t e s of PACFLT and t h e experimental and control groups.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Participation in the HRM Cycle by operational Navy units results in small, but significant, initial improvements in first-term reenlistment rates. This significant improvement, however, is not sustained over long periods although participating units continue to show slightly higher reenlistment rates than control units.
As is typical of research t h a t relies on historical data, this effort raises a number of questions. A framework for categorizing these questions can be developed in light of two basic orientations for evaluating organizational development programs (Bowers, 1976) . The first, called "bottom-linett evaluation, focuses solely on perf ormance outcomes. The second, sometimes labeled llmid-course correction," is designed to use evaluation as a method for further development or modification of existing programs. This type of evaluation requires in-depth knowledge of specific activities and processes t h a t occur during an organizational intervention.
The current study clearly falls within the "bottom-line" evaluation category. The research design and hypotheses were presented as if t h e HRM Cycle were a static process. In reality, there a r e numerous variables t h a t can influence t h e success and impact of Navy OD activities (Crawford, 1977) . Thus, future research should a t t e m p t to isolate those variables t h a t a r e important to the effectiveness of the HRM Cycle. Such research should consider: (1) t h e roles of f a c t o r s such as scheduling, CO/XO rotation, and command mission, (2) workshop effectiveness as related to recognized outcomes (e+, productivity, operational readiness, retention, etc.), and (3) alternatives to survey-guided diagnosis and development as a means of improving organizational conditions within commands. 
